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ABSTRACT
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore how, in unpredictable policy
environments, specific managerial choices play a vital role in designing lobbying
capabilities through the choice of levels of investment in human capital, network
relationships and structural modification.
Methodology/approach – Using an inductive case study approach, data was collected
through 42 in-depth, semi-structured interviews and documented archival data. Cross-
case pattern sequencing was used to construct an interpretive model of lobbying
capability design. Data was framed by the dynamic resource-based theory of the firm.
Findings - Heterogeneous lobbying capabilities are adapted differently in private and
state-owned airlines as a result of diverse ownership structures and time compositions
that interplay with organizational processes. The result is a divergence between private
and state-owned airlines in how they engage with governmental actors and policies.
3Research implications/limitations - We contribute to ongoing discourse in and between
the dynamic capabilities and corporate political activity literatures, particularly on how
state/non-state owned airlines design their political lobbying capabilities. The research is
limited in so far as it only studies the European airline industry.
Originality/value – The paper illustrates how a specific and far-reaching unanticipated
external policy stimulus (the 9/11 terrorist attacks) impacted on management choices for
lobbying design in the European airline industry.
4INTRODUCTION
The creation and preservation of competitive advantage is a core challenge for all
strategic managers but political lobbying is often underestimated as a means of directly or
indirectly creating and sustaining industry or market advantage. Building on the resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm and conscious of the difficulty in establishing causality
with performance, the concept of dynamic capability has emerged as a primary construct
for explaining how firms can improve efficiency and effectiveness and lay the
foundations of competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997; Zollo and Winter, 2002; Helfat
and Peteraf, 2003; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003; Ethiraj et al., 2005; Helfat et al., 2007;
Teece, 2007; Sirmon et al., 2007; Ambrosini et al., 2009; Easterby-Smith et al., 2009).
Adopting more of a process approach than existing RBV concepts, dynamic capabilities
are the bridge between firm resources and business context, focusing on how firms can
create best practice, if not industry or market advantage, through the reconfiguration,
integration and deployment of competencies in conditions of market change (Ambrosini
et al., 2009). As such, dynamic capabilities can constitute the underpinnings of
competitive advantage in rapidly changing environments (Teece, 2007). Although not
exclusive in earlier definitions, the focus of most research has been on ‘market’ change.
A number of scholars have suggested that firm resources can be cross-fertilized into a
nonmarket environment, in particular to the corporate political context (Baysinger and
Woodman, 1982; Baysinger, 1984; McWlliams et al., 2002; Bonardi et al., 2006; Frynas
et al., 2006; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Capron and Chatain, 2008). However, the
criticism of some of these studies from the political focal lens is that they are not paying
attention to the managerial coordinative activities by which firms assemble and leverage
knowledge assets in given policy environments.
5The aim of this study is to examine how lobbying capabilities are designed by
both state and non-state owned European airlines, and more importantly their senior
management in uncertain, unpredictable policy contexts. In other words, we seek to
understand how Europe’s long established network carriers (so called ‘legacy’ airlines)
design their lobbying capabilities to influence European and national institutions and
related agents during the 2001-2005 timeframe. We argue that a lobbying capability is a
high level capability that most firms have embedded in their practices as a basis for
competitive advantage, but we aim to explicate the dynamics and interactions between its
micro foundations (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Bonardi et al., 2006; Oliver and
Holzinger, 2008).
Following the typical format of inductive research, our paper addresses the
criticism of neglecting managerial coordinative activities, business-government relations
and the given context (Hillman et al., 2004; McWilliams et al., 2002). It contributes to
the current academic debate in RBV by providing empirical evidence on design choices
in corporate lobbying activities that is contextualized in a given policy environment.
Building on previous studies that highlight how firms appropriate value through
influencing policy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), we argue that lobbying capabilities are a set
of specific and identifiable strategic and operational processes that are used by firms to
leverage political resources in the nonmarket environment. The findings of politically
active airlines demonstrate how ownership structures and uncertainty moderate strategic
choices in capability design.
6THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Firms engage in both market and nonmarket strategies to create shareholder value
(Baron, 1995, 2001). Whereas market strategies involve decisions such as product
positioning and pricing, nonmarket strategies are actions taken by the firm in its political,
regulatory, and social environments for the purpose of increasing or defending firm value
(Baron, 1997). Political behavior includes such company activities as lobbying a
legislator or regulator, litigating a case in court, and making campaign contributions. Two
aspects to understanding lobbying activities are: first, how much lobbying behavior
corporations are likely to undertake; and second, whether lobbying will be undertaken
from inside a firm or externally using professional lobbyists or trade associations within
the industry sphere. These questions are important as they relate to both corporate
strategy and the boundaries of the firm. Put another way, an inquiry into senior
managers’ choice in designing their internal or external lobbying capabilities will
demonstrate that under conditions of uncertainty, managers must make judgments about
the correct course of action (Peteraf and Reed, 2007).
Lobbying capabilities and their value to firms is acknowledged in international
business and strategic management literature (Baysinger et al., 1985; Getz, 1997;
Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Henisz and Zelner, 2003). It has
preconditions for influencing decision shaping and decision making (Coen, 1998). Keillor
et al. (2005) suggesting that firms involved in using their lobbying capabilities have three
motives for engaging in political behavior: domain advantage, domain defense and
domain maintenance. The implied reason for engaging in political behavior can be a
desire to pursue the firm’s private interest (i.e. domain advantage), to manage public
policy that might be at odds with the firm’s strategic goals (i.e. domain defense), or to
7influence public policy that might threaten the means by which a firm achieves it goals
(i.e. domain maintenance). A variety of political behaviors can be used to accomplish the
firm’s overall objective of dealing with political issues. These include business-
government relations, political inducements and contributions and, in this study, overt
lobbying (Baysinger and Woodman, 1982; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; Henisz and
Zelner, 2003; Hillman et al., 2004). The resulting benefits to the firm can include
reduced environmental uncertainty, reduced transaction costs, and increased long-term
sustainability (Hillman et al., 1999). Governments represent major sources of uncertainty
for firms because they often control critical resources and opportunities that shape
industry and competitive environments (Jacobson et al., 1993; Baron, 1995). As a result,
many firms engage in lobbying strategies: proactive or reactive actions to affect the
public policy environment in a way favorable to the firm (Baysinger, 1984).
Previous studies have shown that dynamic capabilities can take a variety of forms
such as pricing capabilities (Dutta et al., 2003) or entrepreneurial capabilities (Karra et
al., 2008). We take the view that lobbying capabilities have been used by large
organizations within a wide range of industries to create change or align with change.
These industries include oil and gas (Frynas et al., 2006), electronics (Yoffie and
Bergenstein, 1985; Lawton, 1996) and air transport (Brown, 1987; Lawton, 1999).
Lobbying capabilities are rendered dynamic when they align with nonmarket change.
They are viewed to be high-level, strategic capabilities instead of merely operation
capabilities (Bonardi et al., 2006). Drawing on Teece et al. (1997), Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000) and Bonardi et al. (2006), we describe lobbying capabilities as:
8As noted above, we introduce the concept of lobbying capabilities to understand how
senior managers design their lobbying capabilities using strategic decisions to influence
government for the compensation package post 9/11. Some researchers have shown that
lobbying can occur through internal or external paths as they both use the capacity of
firms to leverage skills and resources so as to successfully manage and influence the
public policy process (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). They are specific to the jurisdiction
in which the firm operates and allow the firm to configure lobbying strategies to fit the
context of a particular situation (Bonardi et al., 2006). These include the networks of
relationships between corporate employees and national and local political, regulatory,
legal, and interest group actors who influence or determine public policy. However, what
is not understood in previous studies is how lobbying is designed between state and non-
state owned companies (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001),
especially in the airline industry.
Internal and external lobbying capabilities
To examine how lobbying design processes vary between state and non-state owned
airlines, we first need to make a distinction between internal (unilateral) and external
(multilateral) approaches. In doing so we are challenging the contention that state-owned
carriers tend to rely on internal capabilities, leveraging influence through direct interface
Corporate political processes, specifically the ways in which a company’s senior and
acting representatives work together to reconfigure and leverage political resources
that an organization uses to respond to or even create nonmarket change. Lobbying
capabilities are thus the organizational procedures by which senior representatives or
acting representatives achieve resource configurations that enable the company to
adapt to or even anticipate shifts in the corporate political environment.
9with national government agents and agencies. Non-state owned carriers combine this
approach with external capabilities exerted through their influence within trade
associations and airline networks and the occasional and usually targeted use of contract
lobbyists. Existing research on lobbying tends to focus on the amount and type of
lobbying that occurs. It has largely omitted the organizational options, combinations and
mechanisms firms have for lobbying, i.e. the action of lobbying from a corporate
perspective. Since the seminal work of Olson (1965), economics and management
research has focused on the ability of individuals and groups to overcome the free-rider
problem in creating collective action (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1980; Bendor and
Mookherjee, 1987). Whilst the collective action literature has much to say about the
amount of lobbying that occurs, all these studies are less informative when it comes to the
design choice of lobbying capabilities (Hillman et al., 1999). The state of scholarly
knowledge about lobbying capabilities and how they are combined remains scant when
compared with research on strategies for the marketplace (Brown, 1997).
Few scholars view lobbying capabilities as both internal and external to the firm
but both can still be embedded in the strategic architecture of the firm (Oliver and
Holzinger, 2008). The internal approach refers to lobbying individually while external
lobbying refers to corporate political action using trade associations or through contract
lobbyists. Furthermore, these arrangements of internal and external lobbying capabilities
in Europe respond differently to different environments (Kyrou, 2000). But those
lobbying capabilities considered in this paper leveraged on both internal and external
political resources. These political resources are embedded in trade associations, contract
lobbyist, lawyers and in-house government affairs departments (De Figueiredo and Tiller,
2001).
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Managerial choices, political resources and the policy context
With this array of political resources available to airline companies, why were certain
options pursued exclusively or primarily in specific policy contexts? It is at this juncture
that we consider managerial choice and resultant actions. The senior managers choices
and their focused strategic action are important topics to be looked at in understanding
the design of dynamic capabilities (Peteraf and Reed, 2007; Pandza and Thorpe, 2009;
Ambrosini et al., 2009). The idea of senior management exercising lobbying action in a
concerted fashion to manage its political environment is not recent. Fainsod (1940)
suggested that an industry obtains a favorable regulation by its capacity to mobilize three
kinds of resources: financial (political campaign financing), human (the use of lobbyist
and lawyers) and political (political coalition-building). The notion of senior
management assembling specific resources and skills was also mentioned by Leone
(1977) and Peteraf and Reed (2007), while Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985) spoke of the
accumulation by firms of relationship capital. Within the political science literature, the
notion of relationship resources that create capabilities has been suggested, but the theory
on managerial choices is underdeveloped and empirical evidence has some shortcomings
(Dehan, 2005).
Designing lobbying capabilities require management interventions. Some studies
have found that in specific regulatory contexts, the impact of a policy will be unequal
across different firms (Coen, 1997, 1998). Firms with differing resource bases to manage
their political environment will have different responses to expectations about
profitability and investments in political situations (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Given
the incremental nature of capability design, firms that seek to design superior capabilities
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as the basis of sustainable competitive advantages must prevent the overall coherence of
their capability design efforts from being eroded (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Somewhat
paradoxically, this makes the choice of lobbying actions an important factor to consider
in different environmental context types. Lockett et al., (2009) have critically highlighted
that dynamic RBV tends to focus on consequences of firm heterogeneity but more
scholarly attention needs to be devoted to capability and resource functionality and
design. Together, these gaps lead to the first research question of this study. How do the
senior managers of European airlines design lobbying capabilities in unpredictable policy
contexts?
Henisz and Delios (2004) argue that two types of environmental uncertainty exist:
one predicated on lack of information about a particular environment and the other
arising due to a change in that environment. Their research examines foreign direct
investment decisions in the context of environmental uncertainty in host countries.
Building on the Henisz and Delios (2004) definition, our study is framed by
environmental uncertainty resulting from what we term predictable and unpredictable
policy contexts. The predictable context is one in which the firm expects to be confronted
by policy decisions, stakeholders, issues or actions within a nonmarket political system,
e.g. the onset of market deregulation (Kim and Prescott, 2005). As a result, the firm must
proactively react to this unanticipated policy context. Our study focuses on the less
certain, unpredictable policy context. Building on Brink (2004) and Oliver and Holzinger
(2008), we define our chosen unpredictable policy context as:
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The chosen context in this investigation is one in which unpredictable policy outcomes
came about as a result of events post the September 11th 2001 (hereafter 9/11) terrorist
attacks in the United States (U.S.). The attacks had significant impact on both U.S. and
international airlines. Within this context, European airlines that operated transatlantic
services came to learn quickly that sustaining their competitive positions was reliant on
effective lobbying of the European Commission and national governments. This was to
secure compensation to support their growing debts, exacerbated by a fall in demand and
extra costs associated with new government security policies (Tarry, 2005; Bonham et
al., 2006). If airline firms did not lobby, they risked receiving less aid and consequently
undermining their market positions. The compensation package stimulus was where
airlines wanted European governments or the European Commission to compensate them
for the loss in revenues caused by the grounding of their fleets in the U.S. immediately
after the 9/11 attacks.
In this paper we consider the relative importance of managerial choices in
designing lobbying capabilities. This enables us to understand the degree to which
lobbying capabilities are configured in conjunction with the unpredictable policy context.
We also focus on the role of a senior management team’s strategic focus, or what some
scholars call management choices (Peteraf and Reed, 2007), in designing lobbying
capabilities so as to understand the components and interactions of resources. Finally, we
concentrate on the interconnectivity between lobbying capability and an organization’s
An unpredictable policy context is where the firm is unexpectedly confronted
by policy decisions, stakeholders, issues or actions within a political system.
As a result, the firm must react to this policy context.
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unpredictable policy context. From the gaps highlighted above we arrive at our second
research question. Are there any specific patterns of strategic action associated with the
design of lobbying capabilities in state versus non-state airlines?
METHODOLOGY
This study used a qualitative methodology, specifically a multi-case design which
supports theory replication logic whereby a set of cases is treated as a series of
experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm a set of concepts (Yin, 1999). As a
result, these concepts begin to uncover complex processes of capability construction but
especially indicate promising future iterations of data collection and analysis. In this
study our primary unit of analysis is how lobbying capabilities are designed in the airline
industry.
Sampling. The choice of this industry - and specifically European long haul
carriers - is largely due to its degree of politicization. The European airline industry has
been fraught with politics and governmental interference since its inception and airlines
have had to battle with the politics of regulation and deregulation, both domestically and
internationally (Brown, 1987; Staniland, 2003). We identified several firms that met our
initial criteria of: (a) operating scheduled transatlantic services; (b) having a significant
historical perspective (i.e. were not recent start-ups); and (c) making statements in press
releases or via the media that they were in the process of reconfiguring some important
aspect of their lobbying activities. We contacted all these firms (state and private owned)
and subsequently selected five (Table I), based on willingness to provide interview access
to their political affairs managers.
14
Take in Table I
Data Sources. We asked political affairs managers and directors what lobbying actions
they employed in response to the 9/11 attacks and their responses shaped our research
phenomenon. We posed key questions to all our respondents around the strategic
responses undertaken in organizing their internal and external capabilities to create
influence. Furthermore, we asked them to highlight which resources and processes were
perceived to be important during these challenging times. Finally, we asked them if they
were using existing capabilities or developing new capabilities.
Data was collected through in-depth, semi-structured interviews and documented
archival data between 2001 and 2005. We interviewed the directors, presidents and
managers of Political, Government, Aeropolitical, and Public Affairs, as well as members
of the top management team at the next level of the hierarchy who were responsible for
the areas targeted for lobbying development during the chosen policy context and period.
We also interviewed industry experts to enhance validity. We conducted in total 42
interviews, ranging in duration from 50 to 90 minute telephone and in-person interviews.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed in English. Several hundred pages of
documents involving lobbying activities during this period were available for most
airlines. Access to the lobbying documents provided extremely detailed descriptions of
selected lobbying processes, as confirmed by key informants.
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The preponderance of dynamic capabilities literature tends to describe the specific
capabilities of an organization as homogenous and separate from management judgment
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003). In contrast to this common view, our study of micro-
processes that embody lobbying capabilities revealed variations in enactments of
lobbying capability design. Our analysis allows a fine-grained interpretation of how
managerial choices in designing lobbying capabilities used both internal and external
means and resource configurations (human, network and organizational). However, these
design choices and logics had some performance consequences across the five case
studies.
Lobbying capability design patterns
Our empirical evidence derived from each case individually led to two important
findings. First, each of the strategic choices taken by private or state owned airlines
distinctively affected the design characteristics associated with the senior management’s
choices in lobbying action (Schwenk, 1988). High levels of focused senior management
action led to design variations in the lobbying capabilities that was proactively controlled
in private owned airlines, but less so compared to state owned airlines. One important
aspect of these controlled strategic actions was that sense giving by senior management
tended to occur in an organized, systematic fashion, rather than ad hoc (Schwenk, 1988):
focused management priorities were dominated by scheduled meetings, formal
committees, and planned action with restricted attendance, rather than by informal
meetings. Strategic action occurred in this controlled way because senior management
16
drew on their formal authority to design their lobbying capabilities in order to influence
to receive a compensation package for the grounding of their planes.
A second key aspect of controlled strategic actions was that a significant amount
of focused approach occurred in private airlines between policy makers and senior
management, rather than the loose approach taken by the more state owned airlines that
used mainly trade associations to lobby for the compensation package. Senior
management from private owned airlines leveraged key resources available to them –
namely human and network - from the onset of 9/11, to defend their financial position so
that they could influence policy makers for the compensation package.
The strength of the evidence and whether or not management action was focused
on specific political resources did actually explain differing designs in lobbying
capabilities between private and state. We had not originally expected the design patterns
to exhibit such divergent pathways. Nevertheless, our non-state and state airlines - both
strongly supported by scientific evidence but displaying very different design outcomes -
represented such polar cases. The evidence for this will be unfolded in the next sections.
Choosing between internal and external lobbying capabilities
All five airlines were not found to be lobbying the U.S. government at any time for
compensation package rising from 9/11, as it was viewed to be the less effective route
according to managerial choices. We found that senior management teams took decisions
to design a lobbying capability by shifting the focus from the national level to the
international - or supranational - European Union (EU) level, as time played a vital role
in decision-making. There was a crossover in lobbying between the national and
international targets, as airlines started to talk to their own governments first, followed by
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EU level government members, but then realized that the Association of European
Airlines (AEA) was the fastest route to create influence.
The internal and external capabilities were used to leverage on three specific
political resource types, as shown in Table II. Our analysis indicates that political
resources used by European long haul airlines in the post 9/11 unpredictable context were
comprised of mainly human and organizational resources. But physical resources were
often replaced or superceded by another resource. Most of our respondents repeated the
words ‘network resources’, as being crucial to developing a lobbying capability.
Therefore, we conceptualize political resources as being comprised of three subdivisions:
human and organizational as Barney (1991) noted but with the addition of network
resources (Granovetter, 1973).
Take in Table II
From the cross case analysis, we found a combination of internal and external capabilities
that were used to leverage on political resources in the unpredictable policy context to
create influence. But in private owned airlines, the management priority at the start was
on using internal lobbying capabilities to leverage political resources, compared to state
owned airlines that used more external capabilities. We came to learn that eventually
both airline types used mainly the AEA to lobby post 9/11 because they had less time to
maneuver in this unpredictable period. It was believed that the airlines wanted to
leverage their external relationships but did not have time to do so. Furthermore, as most
airlines had similar problems, they believed that the AEA (being a strong external
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network resource) would have more influence then a single route approach. As one
informant from a private owned airline put it:
From the in depth cross case analysis of the evidence, we found political resources to be
leveraged, reconfigured and deployed using internal capabilities (e.g. sending emails,
formal letter writing, talking to friends from within the firm) and external capabilities
(e.g. Using AEA to email and organize various important meetings). Moreover, we found
that strategic actions involved structural investments, human capital investments and
network relationship investments in the design of the lobbying capabilities. However, at
a micro level, internal or external lobbying capabilities were used differently between the
private and state owned airlines.
The role of management choice in designing lobbying capabilities
Our data suggest at the core of lobbying capability design were the approaches of
individual political affairs managers. These people played an important role in
developing the content of lobbying process. It reflects the interaction between
management and its environment and it also shows how an organization manages this
relationship (Simon, 1947; Ginsberg, 1988; Walsh, 1995; Gavetti, 2005). Our research
suggests that learning by doing is one part of the process in order to make sense of
lobbying context and content (Thomas et al., 1993; Chang, 1995; Anand and Khanna,
We were using a combination of lobbying processes. These routines were the same
as the ones used in other issues but in greater frequency and different combinations.
The routines were used to influence our governments and EU level political actors.
This was an extraordinary event so we used a mix of capabilities that we believed
would create positive influence. These combinations are not a strict recipe but more
dependent on what our owners have in mind.
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2000). Prior work shows that leaders and managers often possess attributes that make
them better at making decisions as they go along rather than planning a decision-making
process in advance (Allinson, Chell and Hayes, 2000). Likewise, the fast pace and stages
that need actors to be reactive or proactive makes many lobbying processes less valuable
when one has to plan far in advance. Some research contends that executives are better
served by learning processes through systematic observation of outcomes instead of
through pre-planned materials that may be outdated or obsolete for the current situation
(Bird, 1988). In this way, our data suggests that the content of lobbying capabilities
begins to form before there is any ‘doing’ at all. As one informant put it:
Rather than jumping in and using a laissez-faire path creating strategy, directors of
political affairs used their choices from previous experience and learning to channel and
fuel their decisions on the lobbying process. In this way, management thought plays a
very important role in developing the architecture of lobbying capability. Consequently,
we found that ownership played a vital role in defining the design of the lobbying
capability based on networks, structure and human resources.
Tables III and IV summarize the evidence involved in advancing the choices in
design, together with the inter-group issues needing to be resolved before the lobbying
would be undertaken. For example, the private and state owned airlines revealed different
patterns of lobbying practices using their internal and external capabilities (Lyon et al.,
We learn by doing. I am always learning at home. In fact that is how we build our
decision making process by doing things as we go along. I get home and start to
think about the issues on the plate, and then I refer to my library…. in this context,
we determine our decision on the choice of level and type of strategy. Then we
consider the content for our argument to influence, the targets to contact and the
mode of direct or indirect lobbying.
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2004): the use of trade association for the compensation package versus action from
within the firms and above all the question of where and by whom lobbying should be
delivered.
Take in Table III
Take in Table IV
This debate was associated across all cases with emergency policy initiatives on steps to
help airlines stay financially sound. A national transport group was set up on this issue
and included representatives of the airline profession, ministers, and advocacy groups.
The following proposition summarizes the nature of the actions associated with lobbying
capability design.
Proposition 1: In unpredictable policy contexts, the policy environment moderates the
lobbying capability design choices more significantly in state owned airlines than in
privately owned airlines.
Assemble the structure to design the lobbying capabilities
One of the ways through which lobbying capabilities are designed – as found in all five
firms - was adapting the lobbying capability of the firm. We use the term ‘adapting’
because it was used by one of our informants and adequately reflects the notion.
Informants expressed that they were working towards bringing lobbying process to ‘the
following stage’ in the unpredictable policy context. Different organizations and their
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respective departments of political affairs focused on different aspects of management
and organizing in order to develop their lobbying processes to influence regulators on
insurance coverage, security cost and compensations package issues. For instance,
developing a lobbying capability was associated with greater levels of departmental re-
structuring among the top management teams from state owned airlines as opposed to
privately owned or publicly listed airlines. In other words, for mainly state owned
airlines, lobbying activities in this challenging policy context changed, often leading to
structural reorganization and formal redefinitions of the responsibilities of new units and
substructures within the political affairs office. These state owned airlines transferred
most of their lobbying efforts to interest group representation - through the AEA – within
weeks of the 9/11 attacks.
On the other hand, the privately owned airlines did not spend time re-structuring
their departments at the outset like government owned airlines did. Instead, the decision-
making focused initially more on individual influencing with specific national targets, but
then realizing that time was of the essence, these firms adopted a dual pronged strategy.
This dual pronged lobbying strategy had an individual lobbying component but with a
greater level of responsibility transference for decision making to interest group
representation - the AEA - where there was more of an attempt for a joint problem
solving strategy. An informant explained the rationale in more detail from a state owned
airline:
In this crazy environment, we invested more time into structure of our lobbying
then in private owned airlines like BA.
22
This finding confirms an extant view of dynamic capabilities as constrained by the
structural organization of firms (Teece et al., 1997). At the same time it refutes existing
views that organizational structures tend to be static and impede the development of a
firm’s dynamic capabilities (Marengo et al., 2000). Our observation suggests that state
owned airlines were re-structuring to reconfigure their lobbying capability so as to align
it with the new policy environment, while private airlines had a more sophisticated
lobbying capability that was better prepared for unpredictable events. Moreover, private
airlines had what they perceived to be good political resources and lobbying
competencies for the post-9/11 period, which they used to exert individual influence from
the outset. Indeed, departmental modification was found to be slightly different between
private and state owned airlines. Privately owned airlines believed that they needed to
focus more on the human and network resources to modify their lobbying capability.
There were some interaction effects between organizational structure and human
resources, where people were taken out to develop lobbying capabilities in order to make
it efficient for potentially new policy issues. Incidentally, we found that efficiency was
dictating the lobbying capability development process and as a result of this, policy
context was creating a sort of push effect on airlines. The nature of the accounts arising
from the focused management choices on structure is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: In unpredictable policy contexts, department restructuring occurs more
substantively in state owned airlines than in private owned airlines.
23
Assemble the human resources to design the lobbying capabilities
Another important variable confirming ideas from extant research on dynamic
capabilities is human capital, which links them to changes in specific functional
capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and knowledge flows (Helfat and Rabitscheck,
2000). However, our observations accord greater importance to the role of human capital
in the process of developing lobbying capabilities. In particular, it appears that
identifying and gaining access to what is considered top talent in the area of government
affairs is an important factor in designing lobbying capabilities. As one informant from a
state owned airline said:
Post September 11th we realized that we needed new people who had better EU
knowledge, as that is where things were moving.
Furthermore, our research highlights the role of organizational processes not only in
design but also in discovering what new lobbying capabilities should be developed.
Together these insights suggest that the development of firms’ lobbying capabilities can
be understood as change processes unfolding at two levels: a lower level associated with
the upgrading of the organization’s management capability in terms of staffing key
positions with more experienced and skilled managers and redefining responsibilities at
different levels of the organizational hierarchy; and a higher level associated with
developing new lobbying competencies in order to respond to changing political
environments. These two levels are driven by changing perceptions of top managers
about what it takes to succeed in their nonmarket contexts and what managerial and
lobbying competencies are required to respond to the changes.
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Analyzing the data across all five firms suggested that the momentum for design
choices in lobbying capabilities depended on the amount of competency that the
organization managed to accumulate, which depended on who was hired. Therefore,
interaction effects and overlaps were found between human resources and competence
that played a role in developing a lobbying capability. The following summarizes the
nature of the action associated with fragmented lobbying capability design:
Proposition 3: In unpredictable policy contexts, strategic hiring moderates the structure
of lobbying capabilities more significantly in state owned airlines than in private owned
airlines.
Assemble the network relationship to design the lobbying capabilities
Thirdly, the development of lobbying capabilities frequently entails the creation of new
lobbying competencies by means of re-configuring network resources. Relationships
(also called social capital or networks), were stipulated by nearly all informants as an
important variable in the development of lobbying capabilities. Cast in diverse styles of
argument (Granovetter, 1973; Lin et al., 1981; Coleman, 1990; Nahapiet and Ghoshal,
1998; Finkelstein et al., 2007), social capital has become a ubiquitous metaphor in the
study of organizations. The compelling idea embodied in the notion of social capital is
implicitly or explicitly present in various research streams that focus on how social ties
enhance an actor’s ability to attain its goals. This research identifies one main way in
which political networks can enhance individual and organizational performance. First,
political networks can facilitate access to information, additional resources, and
opportunities (Campbell et al., 1986; Podolny, 2001). Thus, actors with networks rich in
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social capital have privileged access to resources and nonmarket information, and this
should make them better at leading, organizing, and mobilizing other actors towards
collective goals. As one executive informant put it:
Being a state airline means obviously that we can talk to the national government.
The ownership plays a big role in deciding how to lobby. In our case because we
are a government-owned company, we don’t have to lobby the same ways as
British Airways or KLM. We spoke directly to the government, but mainly used
AEA due to time factor in this context.
Early research on social capital focused on the value of relationships as conductors of
information and channels to access resources or social support (Lin, Ensel and Vaughn,
1981). Consistent with the emphasis on relationships, this research has found the
strength of the ties between network resources and the top management team within the
political affairs office to be very important in facilitating access to the appropriate
political information and resources. Vice versa, we found that government receiving
position papers from airlines allowed them to understand the severity of the problem or
challenge facing airline companies. We also found two main ways in which the structure
of the network surrounding a given top management team can confer advantage on the
firm by facilitating access to information-resources, and opportunities - and by helping
overcome dilemmas of collective action (Burt, 1997). First, the structure revolved
around the relationship influence series, where the actual order of who to contact was
crucial in determining what informers called ‘best’ influence. Second, the relationship
micro targets, meaning whom to target, in this time frame, played a vital role. It was
management action that determined the relationship series and target for each senior
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executive. This management intent played a vital role in developing robust lobbying
capability.
As the time factor played an important role, the airlines were looking to exert
rapid influence during this period, so they decided to use the AEA, which had extensive
networks and resources, whilst simultaneously using their own network resources to
develop lobbying capabilities. The level of development of lobbying influence depended
on the structural configuration that the organization managed, which depended on who
was hired and worked at the organization. Therefore, interaction effects and overlaps
were found between the structure and the network that played a role in developing
lobbying capabilities.
The way in which top management intervene plays a very important role in
developing the design for lobbying processes. Our integrated framework presented in
Figure 1 introduces the propositions and the system of variables pertaining to lobbying
capability design. We first describe relationships between the senior managers, the
owners and the three main resources (structure, networks and human capital). We then
examine how the policy context parameters moderate the design choices of lobbying
capabilities. It is important to note that we provide an integrated theoretical construct
that extends the dynamic capability perspective by unbundling the links between
managers, resources and capabilities, taking into account airline features and context.
The central part of Figure 1 illustrates the reciprocal relationships between the
components that emerged dynamically in the course of specific lobbying actions for the
compensation package.
Take in Figure 1
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It is worth noting that although Figure 1 sets management choices at the centre of the
framework, indirectly suggesting that management is able to steer networks, human
capital and structure, this is only true to some extent. We know that management choices
(Child 1984) are also constrained by a set of uncertain - and uncontrollable - events. The
latter means that the effectiveness of managerial choices is dependent on the nature of
external and dynamic uncertain events and, as such, has limitations.
DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTION
In this paper we addressed the answer the question of ‘how’ lobbying capabilities were
designed and whether distinct lobbying patterns emerged during this unpredictable period
in different airlines. We found that the role of the policy environment and ownership
effects play a crucial role in senior managers design choices of a higher-level lobbying
capability combination (internal and external). Furthermore, the rationale shows that
management interventions are affected by their resource endowments and the given
policy environment, which ultimately impacts how lobbying capabilities are designed and
combined to create influence. Each lobbying activity during this period required
relevant doses of directed, conscious efforts at the highest level of the organizational and
trade association management hierarchy (Dosi et al., 2000).
Recent work on the design of dynamic capabilities has emphasized the
constraining effect of organizational history, organizational learning, technological
trajectories, evolutionary paths created by organizational routines and beliefs of top
managers which tend towards inertia (Teece et al., 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000;
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Salvato, 2009). These studies attempt to explore the high-level activities that link to
management ability to sense and then seize opportunities (Teece, 2007; Salvato, 2009).
However, these studies do not explore how strategic managers can design capabilities to
navigate and deal with unanticipated threats. Our study examines how managers in a
specific industry and policy context sense and seize external opportunities so as to design
dynamic capabilities that are used effectively during periods of policy uncertainty (Teece,
2007).
Our first contribution is to highlight a heterogeneous combination of internal and
external lobbying capabilities. These are utilized differently by state and non-state owned
airlines to leverage on their political resources so as to create influence and consequently
obtain favorable compensation package. Recent work has looked at how various
capabilities interact with each other to sustain competitive advantage (Salvato, 2009).
We build on those studies to identify different capability design patterns between state
and non-state owned airlines in the way they combine and aggregate their lobbying
capabilities. The general patterns found combinations of capabilities with the
management focus level inclined towards the external lobbying processes for leveraging
and deploying resources in order to create influence. From the outset, this was more the
case in state owned airlines than in non-state owned airlines post 9/11. Yet according to
the respondents, the pattern was fairly similar after a few months for both state and non-
state airlines (apart from Lufthansa, who believed they used a more balanced process
combination). Nevertheless, the shift to the external lobbying processes occurred because
airlines believed that they had less time to maneuver and everyone had common interests
on the compensation issue. The decision to leverage AEA’s resources was more to defend
competitive positions.
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Having looked at the combination aspects of internal and external lobbying
capabilities, our second contribution is to note that dynamic capability literature has
neglected to look at the effects of ownership on capability design through adaptations. In
our post 9/11 context we find that the capability design is either supported or constrained
by ownership structure. Moreover, we find that the privately owned airlines have a more
sophisticated political capability design, and rely less on external capabilities but instead
try to use both internal and external capabilities.
Finally, research has elaborated the concept of managerial choice to refer to the
capacity of individual managers to modify the resource base of an organization (Adner
and Helfat, 2003). Our inductive lobbying capability design framework has multiple
implications for government affairs managers. In particular, managers need to be able to
acquire, accumulate (political resource endowment), and divest political resources
(political resources i.e. interest groups like AEA, consultants or in-house staff) to have
the most effective resource portfolio at any given time. Managers should also have the
competence necessary to bundle resources to create effective political lobbying
capabilities. Firms especially need to be able to develop new or leverage current lobbying
capabilities, as policy environmental changes can greatly reduce the value of their current
capabilities. Managers must also effectively manage the feedback and learning processes
necessary to continuously update their thinking and adjust the political resource portfolio.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Previous studies on lobbying capabilities are missing an account of how these capabilities
are designed over time in a given policy context. This paper addressed that issue by
providing an account of the genesis and design of lobbying capabilities within European
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flag carrier airlines in the post 9/11 period. It also highlighted that there were design
variations due to ownership effects on the strategic decisions.
Our study suggests that lobbying capabilities are not vague and that, if properly
leveraged, may contribute to market advantage. Our data shows lobbying capabilities
relate to specific processes that are developed by a set of strong and distinct variables.
Data also shows that the design of lobbying capabilities depends on focused management
effort, and these management mindsets consist of particular types of heuristics that
include those about how to affect public policy, e.g. which politician to target, which
networks relationship to invest in, in what order to approach the networks and when to
best influence the relevant political actors (Vining et al., 2005). While the details of
lobbying capability may be unique to a particular firm - which political person to
approach or which network to target - the underlying structure is strikingly different
between private and state airlines. These content differences - and similarities - imply
that lobbying capabilities should be internal or/and external in structure. The unequal
level in the lobbying capability is due to senior managers developing them from different
starting points and along different evolutionary paths (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Our
research findings also show that lobbying capabilities are fairly homogeneous in
unpredictable contexts in a later lobbying capability time frame, whereas heterogeneity is
more evident in the early phase.
Looking at the management choices of senior executives across the different
ownership compositions and issues reveals that privately owned airlines shared a
common form of design choice in this unpredictable policy context. This pattern suggests
that policy issue types may affect the mindset of senior management, in conjunction with
stakeholders that they engage with, and this consequently affects the lobbying capability
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design choices. We can see that each airline in this study demonstrated two types of
lobbying form - internal and external. This raises the issue of investing more in internal
lobbying capabilities versus external capabilities. This finding suggests that there may be
firms in which leaders inevitably become involved in developing their lobbying around
any policy issue and others in which there are dynamic sets of stakeholders (owners) who
almost always seek to contribute to the formation of lobbying capability, irrespective of
the policy issue.
This paper raises important questions for future research on dynamic capability
and corporate lobbying activity. In particular, on the antecedents of political lobbying -
especially the role of the specific policy issue and organization involved in determining
the form (the distinct pattern of leader-ownership interaction) of lobbying capability
development. Although in this study neither ownership nor organization alone
determined the form of lobbying, each appeared to have some impact.
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Table I: Nationality and ownership of the case study airlines
Airlines Ownership Number of
employees
Country of origin
SAS* 21.4% Swedish State
14.3% Danish State
14.3% Norwegian State
50% Private interests
13,528 Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Alitalia 62.4% State ownership
35.7% Private ownership
2% Air France
20,575 Italy
TAP Air Portugal 100% State ownership 5,750 Portugal
Lufthansa* 91.4% Free Float
8.6% Block Ownership
90,673 Germany
KLM* 100% Public quoted company (2001)
96% KLM/Air France (2004)
37,487 Netherlands
* Majority public quoted
Table II: Political resources leveraged in an unpredictable context
Political capital Selected quotes from the interviews
Human Knowledge, training, intelligence, insight and experience obtained in areas such as
law, economics, political and management.
Network These networks include formal, e.g. being a member of an association or committee
and informal, e.g. friends within the political system. Also, relations among groups
within a firm and those in the non-market environment.
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Organizational The formal organizational structure, its planning and coordinating systems.
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Table III: Managerial Choices in an unpredictable context (Non-state owned airlines)
Case Political resources leveraged Quotation Exemplifying the
Depth of the Debate
SAS
Private Owned
Networks *** We were lobbying the EU system mostly through AEA but we also obviously used our national EU representatives. We addressed
the Scandinavian governments and parliaments for the compensation package.
*** To make sure people hear you, you must contact your top trumps quickly, then start contacting other friends at other airlines and
the AEA.
Human *** We kept everything in-house, as that is the best way to keep control on outcomes. Yes, everything was done in-house, so that we
could save money. Hiring consultants is far too expensive and we need to keep the influence knowledge in house
Structure *** At this time we needed to be effective, efficient and more serious about lobbying. Influence on the political decision making process
cannot be made from a distance. You have to be there, physically present in the Brussels environment. That is a structure we introduced
before 9/11 - in 2000. Therefore, there was no real change in our structure. But this was different in state owned airlines.
Lufthansa
Private Owned
Networks *** I think you could say that in this context building new networks was not important because we already had the networks and time
was knocking on our door. In general, I would say the first most important thing we used would be the current network from our people.
The second thing is that our organization has a strong reputation, so this helps to build up such a network and keep your network
healthy. Of course the contact maker has to be well connected and articulate in relaying the information.
Human ** The contacts cannot be born overnight. It’s more complex in our lobbying design. For example in our department after September 11
we had few people from different fields of knowledge. We had thinkers - which is important - and then contactors. At least that is how
we worked then and still work.
Structure *** We did not change our structure. We remained structurally intact with no modifications. Like I said earlier. This department is very
specialized and each person plays a very important role. Lufthansa can be weakened if any of them are taken out of the big picture. Yes
other departments did lose people, like in marketing, but our function is viewed as a very important function.
KLM
Private Owned
Networks *** Well, post-9/11, we built it both ways. We like to form them naturally and by actually targeting specific people we know that might
help us in achieving what we want. We were contacting all the people that we knew had power to get the insurance issue, aviation cost
issue and compensation package issue resolved without affecting our revenue.
Human *** Post-9/11 meant that we had to react quickly, as time meant less money and potential future problems. Having to react quickly
meant that we had no time to recruit new people, and in actual fact it did not make sense hiring new people in this time for us.
Structure *** What we have done is we have slightly restructured in such a way that we were getting smaller in number slowly after 9/11. My
department is now just four while there were five other people in the same area in 2001.
ª The asterisks show the strength of evidence from KLM, SAS and Lufthansa
*** Strong – Strong evidence
** Moderate – Moderate evidence
* Weak – Weak evidence
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Table IV: Managerial choices in the unpredictable context (State owned airlines)
Case Airline Political resources leveraged Quotation Exemplifying the
Depth of the Debate
Alitalia
Majority public
owned
Networks
*** Being a state airline means obviously that we can talk to the national government. The ownership plays a big role in deciding how to
lobby. In our case because we are a government-owned company, we don’t have to lobby the same ways as British Airways or KLM. We
spoke directly to the government, but mainly used AEA due to time factor in this context.
Human *** We had people with some good knowledge in place to deal with the issues arising from 9/11. But you need more time to influence at the
EU level. Maybe our structure and competence was more nationally oriented then EU level, which we tried to fix around 2004 by hiring new
people.
Structure ** We re-shaped in early 2002 and did the main restructuring around 2003. But we definitely re-enforced our lobbying activities because of
all the consequences of the 9/11 attacks.
TAP Air
Portugal
Majority public
owned
Networks *** We used direct contacts, had meetings and phone calls with the treasury, which was not that successful in my view. But yes, I believe
that AEA was the most important way to get our message heard.
*** I think we were slightly limited in who we could talk to being government-owned. But this can be good, as you can well imagine, being
owned by the government means you can organize meetings quickly with important people to inform them about your position. This means
we can be heard in Europe quickly. As we all know there are good things and bad things to being owned by a state.
Human ** We realized that we needed new people who had better EU knowledge, as that is where things were moving.
** People are important and we think that 9/11 hit us hard. We had to lobby using various routines like meetings, communicating using our
phones and face to face, but our people were less EU focused. Therefore AEA became a very important channel for us to have our voice
heard.
Structure ** Oh yes, it became even more crucial to restructure our department after 9/11. Actually that is when they hired me. They changed a bit the
profile of the director for that position in the sense that before the person that was in charge had a more national background. After
September 11, I was recruited because our firm wanted someone that had more of an EU background.
ª The asterisks show the strength of evidence from TAP Air Portugal and Alitalia
*** Strong – Strong evidence
** Moderate – Moderate evidence
* Weak – Weak evidence
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Figure 1: An Integrated framework for lobbying design
Structure
Networks
Human capital
Management Choices
 EXPERIENCE
 LEARNING BY DOING
Policy Environment
OwnershipOwnership
P3 P2
Lobbying Capabilities
P1
